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Abstract—In networked communications nodes choose among
available actions and benefit from exchanging information
through edges, while continuous technological progress fosters
system functionings that increasingly often rely on cooperation.
Growing attention is being placed on coalition formation, where
each node chooses what coalition to join, while the surplus
generated by cooperation is an amount of TU (transferable utility)
quantified by a real-valued function defined on partitions -or
even embedded coalitions- of nodes. A TU-sharing rule is thus
essential, as how players are rewarded determines their behavior.
This work offers a new option for distributing partition function-
based surpluses, dealing with cooperative game theory in terms of
both global games and games in partition function form, namely
lattice functions, while the sharing rule is a point-valued solution
or value. The novelty is grounded on the combinatorial definition
of such solutions as lattice functions whose Mo¨bius inversion
lives only on atoms, i.e. on the first level of the lattice. While
simply rephrasing the traditional solution concept for standard
coalitional games, this leads to distribute the surplus generated
by partitions across the edges of the network, as the atoms among
partitions are unordered pairs of players. These shares of edges
are further divided between nodes, but the corresponding Shapley
value is very different from the traditional one and leads to
two alternative forms, obtained by focusing either on marginal
contributions along maximal chains, or else on the uniform
division of Harsanyi dividends. The core is also addressed, and
supermodularity is no longer sufficient for its non-emptiness.
Keywords—networked communications, cooperative game the-
ory, partition function, Shapley value, lattice, Mo¨bius inversion.
I. INTRODUCTION
For the present purposes, a communication network may
be looked at as a simple graph Gt = (N,Et) varying in
time t. The set N = {1, . . . , n} of nodes or vertices can be
constant, while the set Et ⊆ N2 = {{i, j} : 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n}
of edges in the network at any time t results from node
behavior for given technological environment. In fact, in game-
theoretical models of communication networking [18], [38]
nodes are players whose behavior generally realizes as a time-
sequence of choices over available actions. Most importantly,
these players attain a utility by exchanging information with
each other through the network, while the functioning of
this latter incerasingly often relies on cooperation. In this
view, “cooperative game theory provides a variety of tools
useful in many applications”, allowing “to model a broad
range of problems, including cooperative behavior, fairness
in cooperation, network formation, cooperative strategies, and
incentives for cooperation”, and with applications such as
“information trust management in wireless networks, multi-
hop cognitive radio, relay selection in cooperative commu-
nication, intrusion detection, peer-to-peer data transfer, multi-
hop relaying, packet forwarding in sensor networks, and many
other[s]” [18, p. 220]. In particular, a range of settings seems
to be fruitfully modeled by means of coalition formation games
[42], which combine strategic and collaborative behavior, in
that players choose what coalition to join, while behaving
in a ‘fully cooperative’ manner within the chosen coalition.
Such a modeling choice seems grounded on the evidence that
“recently, there has been a significant increase of interest
in designing autonomic communication systems. Autonomic
systems are networks that are self-configuring, self-organizing,
self-optimizing, and self-protecting. In such networks, the users
should be able to learn and adapt to their environment
(changes in topology, technologies, service demands, applica-
tion context, etc), thus providing much needed flexibility and
functional scalability” [38]. All of this sounds extremely hard
-if not impossible- to achieve without the absolute and constant
cooperation of nodes with each other according to an agreed
protocol that best fits the needs and scope of the whole system.
However, in order for choices to be rational (thereby allowing
to discuss equilibria and related stability concerns), players
have to be rewarded depending on their choices. How to reward
them in partition function-based coalition formation games is
precisely (and almost exclusively) the object dealt with in the
present work, as the central role played by strategic equilibria
in non-cooperative settings is replaced in cooperative ones with
solutions or values, namely with mappings specifying how to
share the surplus of cooperation between players. Solutions
of cooperative games thus address the same stability issue as
equilibria of non-cooperative games, since the idea is that for
relevant generated surplus (i.e. given by, say, a supermodular
lattice function) there are meaningful (i.e. fair, efficient, etc.)
solutions leading everybody to cooperate.
A. Related work
Insofar as TU (transferable utility) games are concerned,
cooperative communication networking is frequently modeled
by means of coalitional games (see Class I in [18, Section
7.2]), namely functions taking real values on the Boolean
lattice [1] of subsets or coalitions of players. This is the
traditional setting where TU games are mostly known, and
the Shapley value is a fundamental solution [36]. However,
recently attention has been placed also on more complex
games involving the geometric (indecomposable) lattice [1] of
partitions of nodes [38]. A partition (or coalition structure)
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is a family of pairwise disjoint (nonempty) subsets of N ,
called blocks (or clusters, in the present framework), whose
union is N . Many environments are characterized by space-
time node dynamics and technological means resulting in a
clustered wireless network Gt at each time t. That is, active
nodes may be partitioned or clustered in conformity with the
given communication technology [2], [24], [25], [52]. For these
settings, the proposed approach relies mostly on distributed
P2P communication systems where all (active) nodes behave
in a collaborative manner, and seems to best fit multi-hop
scenarios, where it may also provide an additional perspective
for identifying cluster heads [3], [6], [7], [8], [9], [20], [26],
[29], [45], [46], [47], [50], [51]. The foundation is perhaps
best summarized by the subtitle of [12], i.e. “real egoistic
behavior is to cooperate!”. When the whole system itself is
very worthy to collaborating users, how to share such a worth
is precisely the purpose of point-valued solutions (possibly
in conjunction with set-valued ones such as the core [37],
[39], see below). The dual perspective applies as well: if
network maintainance is (computationally) demanding, point-
valued solutions also enable to fairly and efficiently share
the corresponding costs. How a constant global cooperation
in communication networking is quantifiable as a partition
function and why this may be meaningfully modeled via
coalition formation are both comprehensively explained in
[18], [38], hence these topics are not discussed here. On the
other hand, what emerges from the novel solutions proposed
in the sequel is that the edges of the network may be looked
at as the true players in partition function-based TU games.
Accordingly, these proposed solutions are mappings that share
the surplus generated by partitions primarily between such
edges. Of course, since edges do not gain from receiving an
amount of TU, their shares are going to be further divided
between the corresponding endvertices [5]. While providing a
reward criterion that enforces trust via automated reciprocal
control because of the involvement of two players for each
share, this is also consistent with a strictly game-theoretical
perspective in view of the following combinatorial argument.
In TU cooperative game theory, partition functions are
global games [14], meant to model cooperation over global is-
sues such as environmental clean-up and preservation. Specif-
ically, every coalition structure or partition P of players has
an associated surplus or worth f(P ), to be interpreted as
the level of satisfaction common to all players attained when
cooperation operates through P . Partitions of players or nodes
are elements of an atomic lattice [1] whose atoms are in fact
the
(
n
2
)
unordered pairs {i, j} ∈ N2 of nodes, namely the
edges of the network. In the same way, singleton nodes or
players {i}, i ∈ N are atoms in the Boolean lattice where
coalitional games take their values. The solutions proposed
in the sequel are defined in terms of lattice functions with
Mo¨bius inversion living only on atoms [33], and this means
mapping any given coalitional game into n shares, one for
each node, and any given global game into
(
n
2
)
shares, one
for each edge. Thus for traditional set functions or coalitional
games the novel definition simply rephrases the existing one,
but for global games it leads to crucial novelties. In this
respect, communication networking is also sometimes modeled
by means of a further type of TU cooperative games, known
as ‘games in partition function form’ PFF (see [18, p. 205]
on [44]). These PFF games assign a worth to every embedded
subset, namely to every coalition embedded into a partition
as a block, and might appear quite puzzling, especially in
terms of their solutions (see [17], [28] among others). A
recent approach [34] shows that embedded subsets may be
dealt with as elements of a lattice isomorphic [1] to the
partition lattice; specifically, PFF games on n players are
combinatorially equivalent to global games on n+ 1 players.
Hence the proposed solutions apply invariately to both global
and PFF games, as explained below insofar as possible, es-
pecially through an example fully devoted to the paralleling.
These different TU games are formalized as lattice functions
in Section II hereafter, while also briefly detailing the well-
known Shapley value of coalitional games as well as the main
combinatorial aspects of global and PFF games. Next Section
III introduces the novel solution concept in terms of Mo¨bius
inversion and atoms, showing how partition function-based
TU cooperative games allow for two distinct Shapley values
because of the linear dependence [1], [49] characterizing
the partition lattice, and with Subsection III.A devoted to
symmetric games (i.e. functions [32]), which seem possibly
useful to model the surplus generated by cooperation in certain
communication networking systems and whose solutions are
determined in a straightforward manner. Section IV shows how
PFF games on n players are isomorphic to global games on
n + 1 players as long as the lattice of embedded subsets is
taken to be geometric following [34], and the isomorphism is
computationally detailed by means of an example. Section V
translates the proposed point-valued solutions in terms of the
core [10], [41], which is the main set-valued solution concept,
while showing that supermodularity is no longer sufficient for
its non-emptiness and by also briefly considering the case
of additive [13] or additively separable [14], [15] partition
functions. Section VI contains the conclusion.
II. TU COOPERATIVE GAMES AS LATTICE FUNCTIONS
TU cooperative games are functions taking real values on
some lattice (LN ,∧,∨) grounded on player set N . Standard
C (coalitional) games v : 2N → R are set functions defined
on Boolean lattice (2N ,∩,∪), where 2N = {A : A ⊆ N}
is the 2n-set of coalitions ordered by inclusion ⊇. The meet
∧ and join ∨ of any two subsets A,B ∈ 2N respectively are
intersection A ∩B and union A ∪B. Othe other hand, global
G games are partition functions f : PN → R, i.e. defined on
the geometric indecomposable [1] lattice (PN ,∧,∨) whose
elements P = {A1, . . . , A|P |}, Q = {B1, . . . , B|Q|} ∈ P
N
consist of blocks A ∈ P,B ∈ Q, namely nonempty and
pairwise disjoint subsets A,B ∈ 2N whose union equals N ,
hence A ∩A′ = ∅ for A,A′ ∈ P while A1 ∪ · · · ∪A|P | = N .
Partitions P,Q are ordered by coarsening >, i.e. P > Q
(or P is coarser than Q) if every block B ∈ Q is included
in some block A ∈ P , i.e. A ⊇ B. Meet P ∧ Q and join
P ∨ Q respectively are the coarsest partition finer than both
P,Q and the finest partition coarser than both P,Q. Lattices
(2N ,∩,∪), (PN ,∧,∨) are atomic, since every element decom-
poses as the join of those elements immediately above the
bottom in the covering graph (or Hasse diagram) of the lattice,
i.e the atoms [1]. Among subsets, ∅ is the bottom and the n
singletons {i}, i ∈ N are the atoms.
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A. The Shapley value
The Shapley value φSh(v) is a fundamental solution of C
games v [36]. Geometrically, φSh : R2
n
→ Rn is a mapping
with φSh(v) = (φSh1 (v), . . . , φ
Sh
n (v)) ∈ R
n defined by
φShi (v) =
∑
A⊆N\i
v(A ∪ i)− v(A)
n
(
n−1
|A|
) = ∑
A⊆N\i
µv(A ∪ i)
|A|+ 1
, (1)
where i ∈ N and µv : 2N → R is the Mo¨bius inversion
of v, i.e. µv(A) =
∑
B⊆A(−1)
|A\B|v(B) [1], [35]. The
values taken by µv are also sometimes referred to as ‘Harsanyi
dividends’ [36]. The former expression obtains by placing the
uniform (probability) distribution over the n! maximal chains
in lattice (2N ,∩,∪), and considering marginal contributions
v(A ∪ i) − v(A) of players i ∈ N to coalitions A ⊆ N\i. A
maximal chain is a n + 1-set {A0, A1, . . . , An} ⊂ 2N such
that |Ak| = k, 0 ≤ k ≤ n and Al+1 ⊃ Al, 0 ≤ l < n, where
⊃ is proper inclusion, hence Al+1 covers Al [1]. In this view,
φShi (v) is the expectation of the marginal contribution of i to
a random coalition A ⊆ N\i, as detailed in [48] in terms of
probabilistic and random-order values. The latter expression
regards µv(A) as the net added worth (possibly < 0) of
cooperation within coalition A with respect to all its proper
subcoalitions B. That is, µv(A) = v(A)−
∑
B⊂A µ
v(B). This
net added worth is equally shared between coalition members
i ∈ A according to the following well-known axiomatic char-
acterization of φSh (v, v′ are C games, α, β ∈ R, i, j ∈ N ).
L (linearity): φ(αv + βv′) = αφ(v) + βφ(v′).
S (symmetry): if v(A ∪ i) = v(A ∪ j) for all A ⊆ N\{i, j},
then φi(v) = φj(v).
D (dummy): if v(A ∪ i) = v(A) + v({i}) for all A ⊆ N\i,
then φi(v) = v({i}).
E (efficiency):
∑
i∈N φi(v) = v(N).
Indexing axes by coalitions A ∈ 2N , C games v ∈ R2
n
are points in a vector space. A main basis of this space is
{ζA : A ∈ 2
N}, where ζA(B) =
{
1 if B ⊇ A
0 if B 6⊇ A
is the zeta
function ζA [1], [35] (also termed unanimity game uA [36]).
Any v is the following linear combination of basis elements:
v(·) =
∑
A∈2N ζA(·)µ
v(A) or v(B) =
∑
A⊆B µ
v(A). If φ
satisfies L, then φ(v) =
∑
A∈2N µ
v(A)φ(ζA). The focus can
thus be placed on the implications of S,D,E for any ζA.
Now, D entails φj(ζA) = 0 for all j ∈ Ac = N\A, while
φi(ζA) = φi′ (ζA) for all i, i
′ ∈ A in view of S. Finally, E
requires φi(ζA) =
1
|A| for all i ∈ A. Observe that the fixed
points of the Shapley value mapping are those C games v such
that v(A) =
∑
i∈A v({i}) for all coalitions A ∈ 2
N . Such set
functions v are valuations [1] of Boolean lattice (2N ,∩,∪),
satisfying v(A ∪ B) + v(A ∩ B) = v(A) + v(B) for all
A,B ∈ 2N . Their Mo¨bius inversion satisfies µv(A) = 0 for all
A ∈ 2N , |A| > 1. Furthermore, µζA(B) =
{
1 if B = A
0 otherwise
.
B. Global and PFF games
The bottom partition is P⊥ = {{1}, . . . , {n}}, with rank
r(P⊥) = n − |P⊥| = 0, while the
(
n
2
)
atoms have rank
1 and consist each of n − 1 blocks, i.e. n − 2 singletons
and one (unordered) pair. Denote by [ij] ∈ PN the atom
whose non-singleton block is pair {i, j} ∈ N2. A main
difference between (2N ,∩,∪) and (PN ,∧,∨) relies in the
join-decomposition [1] of their elements, in that every A ∈ 2N
decomposes uniquely as A = ∪i∈A{i}, while most partitions
admit several decompositions as a join of atoms. In fact,
r(A) = |A| is precisely the number of atoms involved in the
join-decomposition of subset A, while r(P ) = n− |P | is the
minimum number of atoms involved in the join-decomposition
of partition P . This is immediately seen for the top partition
which consists of a single block, i.e. P⊤ = {N}, in that
P⊤ = [ij]1 ∨ · · · ∨ [ij]n−1 for any n − 1 atoms satisfying
|{ij}k ∩ {ij}m| =
{
1 if m = k + 1
0 otherwise
, 1 ≤ k < m < n,
whereas clearly P⊤ > [ij] for all the
(
n
2
)
atoms, entailing that
P⊤ = [ij]1 ∨ · · · ∨ [ij](n2)
too. Define the maximum number
of atoms involved in the join-decomposition of partitions to
be the size s : PN → Z+ of these latter. That is to say,
s(P ) = |{[ij] : P > [ij]}|. Evidently, s(P ) ≥ r(P ), with
equality if and only if P has no blocks larger than pairs.
As outlined above, G (global) games are partition functions
f : PN → R, with f(P ) quantifying the surplus generated
by cooperation when players are operating through coalition
structure P . However, as detailed in the sequel, single players
i ∈ N factually may not provide any marginal contribution
in G games. In terms of communication networks, they are
isolated vertices, hence either inactive (at some time t under
concern) or else not able to communicate with anybody
because of their spatial position. Conversely, atoms essentially
coincide with pairs of players, i.e. hops or edges, and they do
contribute to the functioning of the network as vehicles for
information exchange. In other terms, in order for an edge to
be worthy to the collective, both endvertices must collaborate.
The zeta function ζP (Q) =
{
1 if Q > P
0 otherwise
is the analog
basis element as ζA, A ∈ 2N and again Mo¨bius inversion
µf (P ) = f(P ) −
∑
Q<P µ
f (Q) provides the coefficients of
the linear combination of these basis elements, where < is
proper coarsening and µζP (Q) =
{
1 if Q = P
0 otherwise
. That is to
say, f(·) =
∑
P∈PN µ
f (P )ζP (·) or f(Q) =
∑
P6Q µ
f (P ).
Concerning marginal contributions of atoms [ij], if P 6> [ij],
then P ∨[ij] covers P , usually denoted [1] by P ∨[ij]⋗P , and
P ∨ [ij] obtains by merging those two blocks A,A′ ∈ P such
that A ∩ {i, j} = {i}, A′ ∩ {i, j} = {j}. Maximal chains of
partitions are collections {P0, P1, . . . , Pn−1} where Pk⋗Pk−1,
hence r(Pk) = k, 0 ≤ k < n, with P0 = P⊥, Pn−1 = P⊤.
There are
n!(n−1)!
2n−1 (distinct) maximal chains of partitions.
PFF games may be denoted by h and are more complex
lattice functions, taking their values on embedded subsets,
namely (ordered) pairs (A,P ) ∈ 2N × PN such that A ∈ P ,
i.e A is a block of P . Although ∅ is not a block of any
partition, still Mo¨bius inversion µh needs a bottom element,
and thus (∅, P⊥) is taken to be the bottom embedded subset
[16]. Combinatorial congruhence then requires (∅, P ) to be
an embedded subset for all P ∈ PN , otherwise the resulting
lattice is non-atomic. In this way, the family EN ⊂ 2N ×PN
of embedded subsets (A,P ) such that either A ∈ P , or else
A = ∅, is a geometric lattice isomorphic [1] to PN+ , where
N+ = {1, . . . , n, n+ 1}. The
(
n+1
2
)
= n +
(
n
2
)
atoms of EN
are the n pairs (i, P⊥) together with the
(
n
2
)
pairs (∅, [ij]).
Denote by (EN ,⊓,⊔) this lattice, with order relation ⊒; it
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is comprehensively detailed in [34]. Given the isomorphism,
there are
(n+1)!n!
2n maximal chains in E
N , along which atoms
provide marginal contributions like in C and G games above.
III. SOLUTIONS
Denote by (LN ,∧,∨) a lattice grounded on player set N ,
namely LN ∈ {2N ,PN , EN}, with elements x, y, z, . . . ∈ L,
order relation > and bottom element x⊥. Let L
N
A be the set of
atoms of LN , while C, G and PFF TU cooperative games may
now be dealt with at once as lattice functions f : LN → R.
Recall that f : LN → R, with Mo¨bius inversion µf : LN → R,
is totally positive if µf (x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ LN , while if
f(x ∧ y) + f(x ∨ y) ≥ f(x) + f(y) for all x, y ∈ LN ,
then f is supermodular. Total positivity is a sufficient (but
not necessary) condition for supermodularity. Valuations of
(LN ,∧,∨) are those f satisfying supermodularity with equal-
ity, i.e. f(x∧ y) + f(x∨ y) = f(x) + f(y) for all x, y ∈ LN .
As already explained, for coalitional games v, a solution is
a mapping φ associating with v a further coalitional game
φ(v) which is a valuation of subset lattice (2N ,∩,∪). Hence
φ(v) is an inessential game, as every player is a dummy:
φ(v)(A) =
∑
i∈A φi(v). That is, φ(v) is a coalitional game
formalizing a situation where there is no surplus generated
by cooperation. A standard and most natural assumption is
v(∅) = 0 = φ(v)(∅). Then, given general result [1, Theorem
4.63, p. 190] for valuations of distributive lattices, solutions
φ(v) of coalitional games v may be equivalently defined to be
coalitional games whose Mo¨bius inversion µφ(v) lives only on
atoms: µφ(v)(A) = 0 for all A ∈ 2N such that |A| 6= 1.
Both PN and EN are geometric indecomposable [1, p. 61],
and thus valuations of these lattices are constant functions
[1, Exercise IV.4.12, p. 195]. Accordingly, solutions of G
and PFF games cannot be defined in terms of valuations
of PN and EN , respectively. In fact, solutions of G games
were defined [14] in terms of valuations of subset lattice
(2N ,∩,∪), with the implication that only the worth f(PA⊥ )
of those 2n−n partitions PA⊥ = {A, {i1}, . . . , {in−|A|}} with
at most one non-singleton block is taken into account, where
Ac = {i1, . . . , in−|A|}. Thus Bn− (2
n−n) values taken by f
are disregarded, Bn being the (Bell) number of partitions of a
n-set [1]. The same argument applies to existing solutions of
PFF games [17], [28]. For these reseasons, in the remainder of
this work solutions of TU cooperative games are conceived in
terms of Mo¨bius inversion of lattice functions [33] as follows.
Definition 1: Solutions of cooperative games f : LN → R
are mappings φ : f → φ(f) associating with f an analog game
φ(f) : LN → R whose Mo¨bius inversion µφ(f) : LN → R
lives only on atoms, i.e. µφ(f)(x) = 0 for all x ∈ LN\LNA .
Thus a solution of a game is a lattice function taking values
on the same lattice where the game itself takes its values. In
this way a solution is a game as well, and in particular one
where cooperation no longer generates any surplus. This seems
the only combinatorially consistent way to include G and PFF
games within the standard framework of C games. Let a ∈ LNA
be the generic atom of LN and φa(f) = φ(f)(a). Then,
φ(f)(x) =
∑
a6x
φa(f) for all x ∈ L
N . (2)
Example 2: Consider a simplest G game f : PN → R
defined by f =
(
n
2
)
ζP⊤ . That is, f(P ) =
{ (
n
2
)
if P = P⊤
0 if P < P⊤
.
The size s = φ(f) defined in Section II then seems the
most appropriate solution, as s(P⊥) = 0 while on atoms
s([ij]) = 1 = φ[ij](f), and its Mo¨bius inversion satisfies
µs(Q) =
{
1 if s(Q) = 1
0 if s(Q) 6= 1
. Thus φ[ij](f) = µ
s([ij]) and
s(P ) =
∑
Q6P
µs(Q) =
∑
[ij]6P
µs([ij]) =
∑
A∈P
(
|A|
2
)
.
Following the above traditional axiomatic characterization
of the Shapley value [36], firstly consider L (linearity).
Definition 3: A solution φ is linear if φ(αf) = αφ(f) for
α ∈ R, and φ(f + f ′) = φ(f) + φ(f ′) for f, f ′ : LN → R.
Since {ζx : x ∈ LN} is a basis of the so-called [1] free vector
space R|L
N | of lattice functions f : LN → R, with coefficients
given by Mo¨bius inversion, i.e. f(·) =
∑
x∈LN µ
f (x)ζx(·) or
f(y) =
∑
x6y µ
f (x), a solution satisfying L has form
φ(f) =
∑
x∈LN
µf (x)φ(ζx). (3)
Such solutions are univocally defined by specifying how to
distribute the unit of TU given by ‘zeta games’ ζx, x ∈ LN .
Definition 4: Denoting by x⊤ the top element of LN , a
solution φ is efficient if
∑
a∈LNA
φa(f) = f(x
⊤).
E (efficiency) was conceived [36] to deal with monotone (and
superadditive [40]) C games, in which case it seems a most
natural assumption. But for G and PFF games it requires some
caution. In fact, a lattice function f is monotone if for any
x, y ∈ LN such that x > y, inequality f(x) ≥ f(y) holds,
entailing f(x⊤) ≥ f(x) for all x ∈ LN (while superadditivity
is neither straightforwardly translated nor interesting for G
and PFF games). When modeling the surplus generated by
cooperation in clustered (multi-hop mobile) wireless networks
as a G or PFF game [18], [38], monotonicity would basically
mean that by putting all nodes into a unique grand cluster
the surplus of cooperation attains its maximum. Evidently,
this is not the case, as the network is clustered (with an
associated computational cost) precisely because partitioning
the nodes enables for a better communication in view of
the available technological infrastructure. One way to deal
with this, while maintaining E as a fundamental axiom for
characterizing solutions, is by letting Mo¨bius inversion µf
take value 0 on all partitions non-finer than that identified
via the given global clustering algorithm [7], [12], [26], [50],
[51], [52]. In terms of lattice functions, this is not much
different from the above definition of solutions, as in both
cases the basic modeling tool is Mo¨bius inversion: taking its
value to be identically 0 on a certain suitable region of the
lattice formalizes the fact that some issues are autonomously
addressed either by the agreed sharing criterion or else by
the given communication technology. Formally, if P ∗t is the
node partition defined by the chosen clustering algorithm at a
generic time t, then µf (Q) = 0 for all Q 6 P ∗t yields
f(P⊤) =
∑
Q∈PN
µf (Q) =
∑
Q6P∗t
µf (Q) = f(P ∗t ). (4)
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While L provides expression (3), E additionally entails that∑
a∈LNA
φa(ζx) = 1 for all basis elements or zeta games
ζx, x ∈ LN . Concerning D (dummy), G and PFF games
are crucially different from C games in view of the linear
dependence characterizing geometric lattices [1], [49]. In fact,
there are no dummy atoms in partition function-based games.
To see this, consider any basis element ζP of G games and
any atom [ij] ∈ PNA (P
N
A being the
(
n
2
)
-set of atoms of PN ).
If [ij] 6 P , then
ζP (Q ∨ [ij])− ζP (Q) =
{
1 if Q 6> [ij] and P = Q ∨ [ij]
0 otherwise
,
while if [ij] 6 P , then
ζP (Q ∨ [ij])− ζP (Q) =
{
1 if Q 6> P and Q ∨ [ij] > P
0 otherwise
.
Observe that this also applies to those
(
n
2
)
zeta games ζ[ij]
grounded on atoms [ij] ∈ PNA , as detailed hereafter.
Example 5: Let N = {1, 2, 3}, hence there are three atoms
[12], [13], [23] and five partitions, i.e. the bottom P⊥ = 1|2|3
(with vertical bar | separating blocks), the three atoms and
P⊤ = [12]∨ [13] = [12]∨ [23] = [13]∨ [23] = [12]∨ [13]∨ [23],
namely the top. For ζ[12], of course ζ[12]([12]) = 1. However,
ζ[12]([13] ∨ [23]) = ζ[12](P
⊤) = 1. This means that even
if G game ζ[12] requires atom [12] to cooperate in order to
generate the unit of TU, still such a unit also obtains through
the cooperation of ‘only’ the other two atoms, namely [13]
and [23], because if these latter cooperate then [12] ‘must’
cooperate too. As detailed in the sequel, this implies that if
the Shapley value of G games is translated according to the
former equality in expression (1), then the unit of TU generated
by zeta games has to be distributed over all atoms. Conversely,
if the latter equality in expression (1) is employed, then the
resulting solution is very different.
Maintaining the axiomatic characterization of the Shapley
value outlined in Section II, in order to formalize S (symmetry)
for G and PFF games recall that the class cP (or type) of
partitions P ∈ PN [1], [35], [43] is cP = (cP1 , . . . , c
P
n ) ∈ Z
n
+,
where cPk = |{A : k = |A|, A ∈ P}| is the number of k-
cardinal blocks of P, 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Analogously, the class of
(A,P ) ∈ EN is cA,P = (cA,P0 , c
A,P
1 , . . . , c
A,P
n ) ∈ Z
n+1
+ , as
embedded subset A may have cardinality 0 ≤ |A| = cA,P0 ≤ n
[34]. Hence x ∈ LN has class cx, for LN ∈ {PN , EN}. Also,
s(x) = |{a : LNA ∋ a 6 x}| is the size of lattice elements x.
The size of (A,P ) ∈ EN thus is s(A,P ) = |A|+ s(P ).
Definition 6: A solution φ satisfies S if φa(f) = φa′(f)
whenever any two atoms a, a′ ∈ LNA allow for a bijection
between {x : LN ∋ x 6> a} and {y : LN ∋ y 6> a′} satisfying
(i) f(x ∨ a) = f(y ∨ a′) and (ii) cx = cy .
Since D cannot be employed to characterize solutions of G and
PFF games in view of Example 5, these remaining axioms L,
E and S do not yield uniqueness, but conversely define a whole
class of solutions. In fact, given L and E, there is a continuum
of alternative manners to also satisfy S, ranging from the fol-
lowing two extreme cases: (a) φa(ζx) =
{
s(x)−1 if a 6 x
0 if a 6 x
,
and (b) φa(ζx) = |L
N
A |
−1 for all atoms a ∈ LNA (and any ζx).
Within this broad class of solutions satisfying L, E and S, a
useful discriminant is the following FP fixed-point condition
(which is a variation of the D axiom applying to C games).
Definition 7: A solution φ satisfies FP if µf (x) = 0 for
all x ∈ LN\LNA entails φ(f) = f .
Thus φ satisfies FP when it maps those games f whose Mo¨bius
inversion µf already lives only on atoms into themselves, i.e.
φa′(ζa) =
{
1 if a′ = a
0 if a′ 6= a
for all a, a′ ∈ LNA . (5)
In comparison with Example 5, this expression states that even
if in G and PFF games every single atom a′ may ‘swing’1 in
the zeta game ζa grounded on a fixed atom a, still FP requires
a to exclusively get the whole unit of TU generated by ζa.
The remainder of this work is mostly concerned with the
following two solutions φCU , φSU satisfying L, E and S.
Definition 8: The chain-uniform CU solution φCU is
φCUa (f) =
∑
x 6>a
κax
κ
(
f(x ∨ a)− f(x)
s(x ∨ a)− s(x)
)
, (6)
where κax/κ is the ratio of the number κ
a
x of maximal chains
(in LN ) meeting both x and x ∨ a to the total number κ of
maximal chains, thus
∑
x 6>a
κax
κ = 1.
The size-uniform SU solution φSU is
φfa(SU) =
∑
x>a
µf (x)
s(x)
. (7)
For C games v, the CU and SU solutions coincide with
the Shapley value, i.e. φCU (v) = φSh(v) = φSU (v), where
1
n(n−1|A| )
= |A|!(n−|A|−1)!n! is the ratio of the number of maximal
chains meeting both A ⊆ N\i and A∪i to the total number n!
of maximal chains, while |A∪ i| − |A| = 1 = s(A∪ i)− s(A)
is the size change. Conversely, for G and PFF games these two
solutions are very different, and in particular φSU satisfies FP
while φCU does not. Explicitely, for any zeta game ζy , y > x⊥,
φSUa (ζy) =
{
1
s(y) if a 6 y
0 otherwise
for all a ∈ LNA . (8)
Hence when y = a expression (5) applies. On the other hand,
f(x ∨ a)− f(x) =
∑
x 6>y6x∨a
µf (y) yields
φCUa (f) =
∑
x 6>a
κax
κ
(∑
x 6>y6x∨a µ
f (y)
s(x ∨ a)− s(x)
)
=
∑
y∈LN
µf (y)

 ∑
x 6>a
x 6>y6x∨a
κax
κ
[
s(x ∨ a)− s(x)
]

 .
Thus for any zeta game ζy, y > x⊥,
φCUa (ζy) =
∑
x 6>a
x 6>y6x∨a
κax
κ
[
s(x ∨ a)− s(x)
] for all a ∈ LA,
1See [36] on the Banzhaf value of C games.
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entailing
φCUa (ζa) =
∑
x 6>a
κax
κ
[
s(x ∨ a)− s(x)
] ≤∑
x 6>a
κax
κ
= 1,
φCUa′ (ζa) =
∑
x 6>a,a′
x∨a=x∨a′
κax
κ
[
s(x ∨ a)− s(x)
] ≥ 0.
For subset lattice LN = 2N , these two inequalities are satisfied
as equalities, in that {x : x 6> a, a′, x ∨ a = x ∨ a′} = ∅ for
any two distinct atoms a, a′ as well as s(x ∨ a) − s(x) = 1,
thus the SU and CU solutions coincide on these basis elements
ζ{i}, {i} ∈ 2
N of C games. Conversely, for G and PFF games
the above inequalities are strict, i.e. s(x ∨ a) − s(x) > 1 for
most x 6> a and {x : x 6> a, a′, x ∨ a = x ∨ a′} 6= ∅ for
any two distinct atoms a, a′. Hence the SU and CU solutions
are different and the latter does not satisfy FP: φCUa (ζa) < 1
and φCUa′ (ζa) > 0 for all a, a
′ ∈ LNA . In practice, the only
fixed points of the CU solution are also fixed points of the SU
solution and take the form of linear functions f = αs, α > 0
of the size s. That is, φCUa (αs) =
=
∑
x 6>a
κax
κ
(
α
[
s(x ∨ a)− s(x)
]
s(x ∨ a)− s(x)
)
= α
∑
x 6>a
κax
κ
= α
for all a ∈ LNA .
A. Symmetric games
An important class of games that may be useful for mod-
eling certain communication networking systems consists of
symmetric ones. In fact, ‘partitions are of central importance
in the study of symmetric functions, a class of functions that
pervades mathematics in general’ [21, p. 39] (see also [23,
Ch. 5], [32], [43, Ch. 7, Vol. 2]). As detailed hereafter, for G
and PFF symmetric games the CU and SU solutions coincide.
Definition 9: C games v, G games f and PFF games h are
symmetric if
• |A| = |B| entails v(A) = v(B),
• cP = cQ entails f(P ) = f(Q),
• cA,P = cB,Q entails h(A,P ) = h(B,Q).
Such v, f and h are indeed invariant under the action of
the symmetric group Sn whose elements are the n! permu-
tations pi : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n} of the indices or node
identifiers i ∈ N . In particular, for every (number) partition
(λ1, . . . , λn) ∈ Z
n
+ of (integer) n (i.e.,
∑
1≤k≤n λk = n), the
number of distinct (set) partitions P of N with class cPk = λk,
1 ≤ k ≤ n is n!
(∏
1≤k≤n k!
cPk cPk !
)−1
[43, Vol. 1, p. 319].
In this view, if f : LN → R is a symmetric lattice function
(where LN ∈ {PN , EN}), then
φSUa (f) = φ
SU
a′ (f) or
∑
x>a
µf (x)
s(x)
=
∑
y>a′
µf (y)
s(y)
for any two atoms a, a′ ∈ LNA . Accordingly, in view of E,∑
a∈LNA
φSUa (f) = |L
N
A |φ
SU
a (f) = f(x
⊤)⇒ φSUa (f) =
f(x⊤)
|LNA |
.
Analogously, a symmetric f yields φCUa (f) = φ
CU
a′ (f) as∑
x 6>a
κax
κ
[
f(x ∨ a)− f(x)
s(x ∨ a)− s(x)
]
=
=
∑
y>a′
κa
′
y
κ
[
f(y ∨ a′)− f(y)
s(y ∨ a′)− s(y)
]
for all a, a′ ∈ LA, hence
∑
a∈LNA
φCUa (f) = |L
N
A |φ
CU
a (f) = f(x
⊤)⇒
⇒ φCUa (f) = f(x
⊤)/|LA|. Basic symmetric partition func-
tions or G games (or PFF games, given the isomorphism exem-
plified in section IV below) are the size s(P ) =
∑
A∈P
(
|A|
2
)
and the rank r(P ) = n− |P | =
∑
A∈P (|A| − 1). Therefore,
φSUa (r) = φ
CU
a (r) =
r(x⊤)
|LNA |
= φCUa (ζa) ≤ 1 = φ
SU
a (ζa)
for all atoms a, with strict inequality if LN ∈ {PN , EN}.
More generally, any f which is itself a function of the rank or
a function of the size (see Example 2) is of course symmetric,
and thus satisfies φCUa (f) = f(x
⊤)/|LNA | = φ
SU
a (f).
IV. ISOMORPHISM BETWEEN G AND PFF GAMES
This section details the computations for the SU and CU
solutions of G and PFF games, while also providing a simple
example of G games on player set N = {1, 2, 3} together with
the isomorphic PFF games on player set N = {1, 2}.
For G games f : PN → R, solutions are
(
n
2
)
-vectors
φ(f) = {φ[ij](f) : {i, j} ∈ N2} ∈ R
(n2). Regarded as lattice
functions themselves, these solutions have Mo¨bius inversion
µφ(f)([ij]) = φ[ij](f) living only on atoms [ij], and thus
satisfy φ(f)(P ) =
∑
[ij]6P φ[ij](f) for all P ∈ P
N .
There are κ =
(
n
2
)(
n−1
2
)(
n−2
2
)
· · ·
(
2
2
)
= n!(n−1)!2n−1 maximal
chains of partitions. The number of such maximal chains
meeting any P , with class cP , is
 ∏
1≤k≤n
(
k!(k − 1)!
2k−1
)cPk  |P |!(|P | − 1)!
2|P |−1
,
where the product on the left is the number of maximal chains
in [P⊥, P ], this latter segment or interval [35] being isomorphic
to ×A∈PP |A|, while the fraction on the right is the number
of maximal chains in segment [P, P⊤], isomorphic to P |P |.
Here Pk denotes the lattice of partitions of a k-set. Thus for
an atom [ij] and a partition P 6> [ij], the number κ
[ij]
P of
maximal chains meeting both P and P ∨ [ij] is κ
[ij]
P =
=

 ∏
1≤k≤n
(
k!(k − 1)!
2k−1
)cPk  |P ∨ [ij]|!(|P ∨ [ij]| − 1)!
2|P∨[ij]|−1
=

 ∏
1≤k≤n
(k!(k − 1)!)c
P
k

 (|P | − 1)!(|P | − 2)!
2|P |−2+
∑
1≤k≤n c
P
k
(k−1)
=

 ∏
1≤k≤n
(k!(k − 1)!)c
P
k

 (|P | − 1)!(|P | − 2)!
2n−2
,
6 | P a g e
yielding
κ
[ij]
P
κ
= 2

 ∏
1≤k≤n
(k!(k − 1)!)c
P
k

 (|P | − 1)!(|P | − 2)!
n!(n− 1)!
.
Therefore, the CU solution is
φCU[ij] (f) =
∑
P 6>[ij]
κ
[ij]
P
κ
[
f(P ∨ [ij])− f(P )
s(P ∨ [ij])− s(P )
]
,
while the SU solution is, more simply,
φSU[ij] (f) =
∑
P>[ij]
µf (P )
s(P )
.
Now for N = {1, 2, 3}, consider the G game f = ζ[12] given
by basis element or zeta game ζ[12] (see example 5). That is
ζ[12](P ) = 1 if P > [12] and 0 otherwise, where [12], [13] and
[23] are the three atoms. Then,
φSU[ij](ζ[12]) =
{
1 if [ij] = [12]
0 if [ij] 6= [12]
and
φCU[ij] (ζ[12]) =
{
2/3 if [ij] = [12]
1/6 if [ij] 6= [12]
, while
φCU[ij] (r) = φ
SU
[ij](r) = 2/3 =
r(P⊤)
(32)
= φCU[ij] (ζ[ij]) for all [ij].
The remainder of this Section is based on the approach to
the geometric lattice of embedded subsets (EN ,⊓,⊔) defined
in [34]. In particular, join ⊔ obtains via a closure operator [1]
cl : 2N × PN → 2N × PN that cannot be detailed here for
reasons of space and mostly because it surely does not fit a
contribution that is aimed to be useful in the area of game-
theoretical models of cooperative communication networking.
Clarified this, if PFF games h are looked at as functions defined
on EN , with solutions φ(h) = {φa(h) : a ∈ E
N
A } ∈ R
(n+12 ) be-
ing lattice functions themselves, then these latter have Mo¨bius
inversion µφ(h)(a) = φa(h) living only on atoms a ∈ E
N
A , i.e.
φ(h)(A,P ) =
∑
a⊑(A,P ) φa(h) for all (A,P ) ∈ E
N .
Lattices (PN ,∧,∨) and (EN ,⊓,⊔) are characterized by
the following isomorphisms:
[(∅, P⊥), (N,P
⊤)] = En ∼= Pn+1,
[(∅, P⊥), (A,P )] ∼= E |A| ×
(
×B∈PAcP
|B|
)
and
[(A,P ), (N,P⊤)] ∼= P |P | if A 6= ∅,
while [(A,P ), (N,P⊤)] ∼= E |P | if A = ∅,
where PA
c
= {Ac ∩B : P ∋ B, ∅ 6= Ac ∩B} is the partition
of Ac 6= ∅ induced by P = {B1, . . . , B|P |} and E
k is the
geometric lattice of embedded subsets of a k-set. Accordingly,
the number of maximal chains in EN (i.e. from (∅, P⊥) to
(N,P⊤)) is κ =
(
n+1
2
)(
n
2
)(
n−1
2
)
· · ·
(
2
2
)
= (n+1)!n!2n , and the
number of those meeting (A,P ) ∈ EN is
(|A|+ 1)!|A|!|P |!(|P | − 1)!
2|A|2|P |−1
n−|A|∏
k=1
(
k!(k − 1)!
2k−1
)cPAck
if A 6= ∅, and
(|P |+ 1)!|P |!
2|P |
n∏
k=1
(
k!(k − 1)!
2k−1
)cPk
if A = ∅. For an atom a ∈ ENA and an embedded subset
(A,P ) 6⊒ a, the number κa(A,P ) of maximal chains meeting
both (A,P ) and the embedded subset cl((A,P )⊔ a) obtained
as the (above-mentioned) join of (A,P ) and a thus is
(|A|+ 1)!|A|!(|P | − 1)!(|P | − 2)!
2|A|2|P |−2
n−|A|∏
k=1
(
k!(k − 1)!
2k−1
)cPAck
=
(|A|+ 1)!|A|!(|P | − 1)!(|P | − 2)!
2n−1
n−|A|∏
k=1
((k!(k − 1)!)c
PA
c
k
if A 6= ∅, and
|P |!(|P | − 1)!
2|P |−1
n∏
k=1
(
k!(k − 1)!
2k−1
)cPk
=
|P |!(|P | − 1)!
2n−1
n∏
k=1
(k!(k − 1)!)c
P
k if A = ∅.
This means that
κa(A,P )
κ =
=
2(|P | − 1)!(|P | − 2)!(|A|+ 1)!|A|!
(n+ 1)!n!
n−|A|∏
k=1
(k!(k − 1)!)c
PA
c
k
if A 6= ∅, while
κa(A,P )
κ
=
2|P |!(|P | − 1)!
(n+ 1)!n!
n∏
k=1
(k!(k − 1)!)c
P
k if A = ∅.
Therefore, the CU solution of PFF game h is φCUa (h) =
=
∑
(A,P ) 6⊒a
κa(A,P )
κ
[
h(cl((A,P ) ⊔ a))− h(A,P )
s(cl((A,P ) ⊔ a))− s(A,P )
]
while the SU solution is
φSUa (h) =
∑
(A,P )⊒a
µh(A,P )
s(A,P )
.
For N = {1, 2}, consider the PFF game h = ζ(∅,[12])
given by the basis element or zeta game ζ(∅,[12]), i.e.
ζ(∅,[12])(A,P ) = 1 if (A,P ) ⊒ (∅, [12]) and 0 otherwise
(for all (A,P ) ∈ EN ), and where (1, 1|2) and (2, 1|2) and
(∅, [12]) = (∅, 12) are the three atoms, with vertical bar |
separting blocks. That is, 1|2 = P⊥ while 12 = [12] = P
⊤,
where (∅, 1|2) ⊏ (1, 1|2), (2, 1|2), (∅, 12) ⊏ ({1, 2}, 12), with
bottom (∅, P⊥) = (∅, 1|2) and top ({1, 2}, 12) = (N,P⊤).
Then the corresponding SU and CU solutions are:
φSUa (ζ(∅,[12])) =
{
1 if a = (∅, [12])
0 if a = (1, 1|2) or a = (2, 1|2)
,
φCUa (ζ(∅,[12])) =
{
2/3 if a = (∅, [12])
1/6 if a = (1, 1|2) or a = (2, 1|2)
,
and φCUa (r) = φ
SU
a (r) = 2/3 =
r(N,P⊤)
(32)
= φCUa (ζa) for all
atoms a ∈ ENA , with r(A,P ) = r(P ) + min{|A|, 1} as the
rank function r : EN → Z+.
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V. THE CORE AND ADDITIVITY
The core C(v) of C games v is often introduced as the
set of point-valued solutions φ(v) that no coalition A ∈ 2N
can block, meaning that under sharing rule φ every A must
receive an amount of TU φ(v)(A) =
∑
i∈A φi(v) ≥ v(A),
with equality for the grand coalition A = N . In fact, if
φ(v)(A) < v(A), then why should coalition members i ∈ A
cooperate with non-members j ∈ Ac? Thus, formally, looking
at the n values of Mo¨bius inversion µφ(v), namely at the n
shares (φ1(v), . . . , φn(v)) ∈ Rn, the core is a convex and
possibly empty subset C(v) ⊂ Rn. It is the main set-valued
solution concept, and the necessary and sufficient conditions
for non-emptyness C(v) 6= ∅ are the well-known ‘Shapley-
Bondareva conditions’ (see, for instance, [18, p. 210]). On
the other hand, supermodularity (also termed ‘convexity’ [41])
of v, that is v(A ∪ B) + v(A ∩ B) ≥ v(A) + v(B) for all
A,B ∈ 2N , is a sufficient but not necessary condition for
non-emptyness C(v) 6= ∅, and total positivity µv(A) ≥ 0
for all A ∈ 2N entails supermodularity (see Section II). In
fact, if v is supermodular, then the extreme points of (convex
polyhedron) C(v) are those solutions obtained by rewarding
each player i ∈ N with marginal contribution v(Ak∪i)−v(Ak)
where Ak, 0 ≤ k ≤ n is a maximal chain in 2N , i.e.
Ak+1 = Ak ∪ i. In such a case, the Shapley value φSh(v)
defined by expression (1) is the center of the core, in that
φSh is the ‘uniform’ convex combination of the n! solutions
associated with maximal chains as just specified (see [41]).
In multi-agent systems, C(v) is important precisely because
coalitions have no incentive to oppose any worth/cost-sharing
rule that is known to be in the core [10], [31], [37], [39].
When all of this is to be translated in terms G and PFF
games, a first conceptual observation is that every partition
involves all players, thus saying that ‘a partition of players
can block a sharing criterion’ (or, more generally, an outcome)
does not seem to allow for a straightforward interpretation.
In fact, partition function-based TU games model situations
where all players cooperate, in some way. Specifically, every
partition formalizes a distinct form of global cooperation,
although the bottom P⊥ seems to unambiguously represent
the case where everyone stands alone2. Furthermore, as already
explained in Section III in terms of monotonicity, the coarsest
partition P⊤ appears to hardly correspond to the ‘best form
of cooperation’, especially insofar as technology leads coop-
erative communication networking to realize through clusters
of nodes. On the other hand, if the possibilities given by the
technological infrastructure are suitably translated by means
of a Mo¨bius inversion living only on a proper interval (or
segment) of the lattice (see expression (4)), then P⊤ does
formalize the required overall agreement on how to distribute
the cost of network maintainance (or equivalently the worth
of its existence), toward optimal global functioning. Despite
these premises, still from a geometric perspective the cores
C(f) ⊂ R(
n
2), C(h) ⊂ R(
n+1
2 ) of G and PFF games f, h are
well-defined in terms of the novel solution concept proposed
here. Maintaining the above notation (LN ,∧,∨) for a lattice
LN ∈ {PN , EN} in order to deal with both these games
at once, Definition 1 in Section III leads to obtain the core
C(f) ⊂ R|L
N
A | of games f : LN → R as the possibly empty
convex polyhedron consisting of those solutions φ(f) such that
2See [14] on how to deal with a bottom partition whose worth is 6= 0.
φ(f)(x) =
∑
a6x φa(f) ≥ f(x) for all elements x ∈ L
N , with
equality for the top x⊤. Now, concerning both (i) the analog of
the necessary and sufficient Shapley-Bondareva conditions for
non-emptyness, and (ii) supermodularity as a sufficient but not
necessary such condition, the main difference with respect to
C games is due, once again, to linear dependence, which char-
acterizes geometric (non-distributive) lattices [1], [49]. In fact,
while noticing that in the CU and SU solutions, respectively,
marginal contributions and the values of Mo¨bius inversion
appear divided by the size of lattice elements, it must be
considered that the size is a totally positive lattice function (as
its Mo¨bius inversion takes value 1 on atoms and 0 elsewhere).
Therefore, in order for C(f) to be non-empty, it is not sufficient
that f is supermodular, i.e. f(x∨y)+f(x∧y) ≥ f(x)+f(y)
for all x, y ∈ LN . Conversely, f has to quantify synergies
minimally as great as those quantified by the size itself.
Example 10: Again, for N = {1, 2, 3} consider the su-
permodular symmetric G game f : PN → R defined by
f(P⊥) = 0, f([ij]) = 1 for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ 3 and f(P⊤) = 2,
where f(P ∨Q)+f(P∧Q) ≥ f(P )+f(Q) for all P,Q ∈ PN
is easily checked: if P > Q, then equality holds, while the
only remaining case is when both P,Q ∈ PNA are atoms, but
f([12] ∨ f([13])) + f([12] ∧ [13]) = f([12]) + f([13]) = 2
(for instance), i.e. equality holds as well. However, f is not
totally positive: µf (P⊤) = 2 − 1 − 1 − 1 = −1 < 0, and
in particular f(P⊤) < s(P⊤) = 3. Thus C(f) = ∅, as
φ[12](f), φ[13](f), φ[23](f) cannot satisfy both φ[ij](f) ≥ 1,
1 ≤ i < j ≤ 3 and φ[12](f) + φ[13](f) + φ[23](f) = 2.
The necessary and sufficient conditions for non-emptyness
of the core of G and PFF games deserve separate treatment.
A. Additively separable partition functions
Partition functions f : PN → R are additively separable
if a set function v : 2N → R satisfies f(P ) =
∑
A∈P v(A)
for all P ∈ PN [14], [15], and are also sometimes termed,
more simply, ‘additive’. They appear in a variety of settings,
ranging from combinatorial optimization problems [22] to
community/module detection in complex networks [13]. These
partition functions admit in fact a continuum of additively
separating set functions, as exempified hereafter.
Example 11: Additively separating the rank. The rank of
partitions r(P ) = n − |P | =
∑
A∈P (|A| − 1) is immediately
seen to be additively separated by the symmetric set function
v (see Subsection III.A) defined by v(A) = |A| − 1 for all
A ∈ 2N , whose Mo¨bius inversion takes values µv(∅) = −1,
µv(A) = 1 if |A| = 1 and µv(A) = 0 if |A| > 1. However, r(·)
may be checked to be also additively separated by the (again
symmetric) set function v′ with Mo¨bius inversion µv
′
(A) = 0
if |A| ≤ 1 and µv
′
(A) = (−1)|A| if |A| > 1, thus v′(A) = 0
if |A| ≤ 1 and v′(A) = 1 if |A| = 2, v′(A) = 2 if |A| = 3,
v′(A) = 3 if |A| = 4, i.e. µv
′
(A) = |A| − 1−
∑
B⊂A µ
v′(B).
Example 12: Additively separating the size. The size of
partitions s(P ) =
∑
A∈P
(
|A|
2
)
is immediately seen to be
additively separated by the symmetric set function v defined
by v(A) =
(
|A|
2
)
for all A ∈ 2N , whose Mo¨bius inversion
takes values µv(A) = 0 if |A| 6= 2 and µv(A) = 1 if |A| = 2.
However, s(·) is also additively separated by (symmetric) v′
with Mo¨bius inversion µv
′
(A) =
{
(−1)|A|+1 if |A| 6= 2
0 if |A| = 2
,
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hence µv
′
(∅) = −1, µv
′
(A) = 1 if |A| = 1, µv
′
(A) = 0 if
|A| = 2, µv
′
(A) = 1 if |A| = 3, µv
′
(A) = −1 if |A| = 4,
µv
′
(A) = 1 if |A| = 5, µv
′
(A) = −1 if |A| = 6 and so on
according to recursion µv
′
(A) =
(
|A|
2
)
−
∑
B⊂A µ
v′(B).
In order to briefly generalize these examples, letAS(f) ⊂ R2
n
denote the convex and possibly empty set3 of set functions
v that additively separate any given partition function f , i.e.
v, v′ ∈ AS(f), α ∈ [0, 1]⇒ [αv + (1− α)v′] ∈ AS(f), as∑
A∈P
[αv(A)+(1−α)v′(A)] = α
∑
A∈P
v(A)+(1−α)
∑
A∈P
v′(A)
=
∑
A∈P v(A) =
∑
A∈P v
′(A) for all P ∈ PN . Emptyness
AS(f) = ∅ corresponds to a non-additively separable f . For
v ∈ AS(f), any v′ ∈ AS(f) obtains recursively as follows:
(i) nµv
′
(∅) +
∑
i∈N µ
v′({i}) = nµv(∅) +
∑
i∈N µ
v({i}),
entailing
∑
i∈N v
′({i}) = f(P⊥) =
∑
i∈N v({i});
(ii) µv
′
(A) = v(A)−
∑
B⊂A µ
v′(B) for all A, |A| > 1,
entailing v′(A) = v(A) for all A, |A| > 1. A similar argument
applies to the set AS(h) of set functions v additively separat-
ing PFF games h, i.e. such that h(A,P ) = v(A)+
∑
B∈P v(B)
for all embedded subsets (A,P ) ∈ EN [34].
Solutions of additively separable G and PFF games can
be approached as traditional solutions of C games (i.e. via
the Shapley value in expression (1), see [14], [28]). But if
AS(f) 6= ∅ 6= AS(h), then the CU and SU solutions
proposed above provide novel criteria for distributing either
the generated TU or else the costs of system maintainance.
VI. CONCLUSION
In a time-varying communication network Gt = (N,Et),
any pair {i, j} ∈ N2 of nodes may be an edge, i.e. a vehicle
for exchanging information, over some period ∆t > 0, and
if an edge has never appeared over the whole history (up to
some ‘present’ t), then it is simply to be regarded as one that
has made no contribution (thus far). In this view, each pair of
nodes receives a (possibly null) share of the surplus generated
by cooperation. Thus the idea is that exhaustive information
about network topology and traffic is constantly collected,
in a distributed and local manner, enabling to use such an
information for each period t − 1 → t in order to reward
nodes at time t. A constant node set N = {1, . . . , n} is also
recognized to be employed here for expositional convenience,
as not only at the begininning of each period a new game starts
being played, but new nodes may also enter at any time t.
In order to exemplify what form a fixed point of the
SU solution of G games may take, consider the case where
the surplus generated by cooperation is simply assumed to
be quantified by the volume of data traffic over the whole
(clustered) network during each time period. In particular, if
the protocol requires redundant transmissions, let all transmis-
sions contribute to the generated surplus independently from
redundancy. In other terms, the (periodical) worth of global
cooperation is the sum over all edges of the traffic that occurs
through them. Then, the share assigned to each edge by the
SU solution is precisely the volume of data that is transferred
through that edge, and thus such a G game is a fixed point of
3v(∅) = µv(∅) being chosen arbitrarily, any AS(f) 6= ∅ is not bounded.
the SU solution (mapping). In practice, this would mean that
an arbitrary unit of data transfer (say 1 MB) is equivalent to an
arbitrary unit of TU (say a token giving temporary priviliges).
Concerning how to divide the share of each edge between
its endnodes, in graph-restricted C games [27], [30] players
must be rewarded by taking into account only their position
in the network and their marginal contributions to coalitions.
In other terms, such players do not have different roles
for network functioning, and thus the share of edges seem
best equally divided between endnodes (as suggested in [5]
for ‘communication situations’). However, in many network-
ing systems different nodes may well play different roles
depending on their (time-varying) energy constraints and/or
computational capabilities. In the simplest case, some of them
are cluster heads while the remaining ones are not. Similarly,
in cognitive radio networks players may be either primary
users or else secondary users. This suggests that in several
communication networking systems the shares distributed over
edges can be next divided between nodes in more sophisticated
manners than just via equal splitting.
A final but seemingly very important remark concerns
Mo¨bius inversion, which was defined to provide “the com-
binatorial analog of the fundamental theorem of calculus”
[35]. Roughly speaking, Mo¨bius inversion may be regarded
as the ‘derivative’ of lattice (or more generally poset) func-
tions, and constitutes a very useful tool for game-theoretical
modeling. For instance, apart from G and PFF games, several
communication networking systems can be modeled by means
of graph-restricted C games [18], [38], and in particular the
Myerson value [27] appears to be an important solution for
such settings. In fact, as outlined in [18, Sec. 7.5.2] and [38, p.
23], the Myerson value is well-known to be the Shapley value
(given by expression (1)) of a novel (i.e. graph-restricted) C
game. However, it may be worth emphasizing that such a novel
game v/G is characterized as follows: (i) it coincides with the
original (unrestricted) C game v on those coalitions spanning
(or inducing [11]) a connected subgraph, and (ii) its Mo¨bius
inversion µv/G takes value 0 on the remaining coalitions [30].
Hence graph-restricted C game v/G (also termed ‘coalitional
graph game’ in [18], [38]) has Mo¨bius inversion µv/G living
only on connected coalitions. Insofar as applications are con-
cerned, this means that the Myerson value may be computed
by means of the second equality in expression (1), once the
non-zero values of µv/G are recursively determined. Hopefully,
the present paper may thus contribute to fostering the use of
Mo¨bius inversion (of all types of TU cooperative games) for
modeling collaborative communication systems.
A. Future work
Definition 1 in Section III enables to reconsider the whole
theory of C games in terms of G and PFF games. As for the
core (see Section V), the well-known Shapley-Bondareva non-
emptiness conditions may be paralleled with focus on what
changes must be introduced in order to take into account the
size of lattice elements. In this view, it seems that dividing
the main expressions for the CU and SU solutions by the size
(see above) is already in compliance with the comprehensive
approach (to the core of C games) relying on ‘concavification’
[4]. From a more general perspective, C games are commonly
looked at as pseudo-Boolean functions, thereby obtaining the
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Shapley, Banzhaf and other values through the gradient of the
polynomial multilinear extension of such functions [19], [36,
pp. 139-151]. A challenging task thus is to reproduce the same
entire pseudo-Boolean framework for G and PFF games.
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